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ABSTRACT 
This paper  exploits  the  new non-response  files of the  Panel  Study of 
Tncome  Dynamics  in  order to study living  arrangement  transitions  of  elderly 
Americans.  The focus of the paper  is an  estimate  of the probability  of 
household  dissolution,  i.e.,  the probabilities  of transitions  from living 
independently  to living with adult  children  or  other related  or unrelated 
persons  and the probability  of  becoming  institutionalized,  and  an 
investigation  of the  factors causing  such transitions. 
Our main result  is an  astounding  stability  of living  arrangements  even 
after  incisive  life-events  such as death  of a spouse, onset of  a  disability, 
or in the years immediately  preceeding  death,  in  particular  the  large 
proportion  of elderly who stay living  independently  until their deaths. 
Almost  two thirds  of all elderly  are living  independently  in the  year of 
their  deaths.  14.4 percent share at least once  housing  with relatives  or 
friends,  3.1 percent  experience  a stay in an institution. 
Old age, being  male or of  low income  significantly  increases  the risk  of 
institutionalization.  Elderly with a large  family and nonwhite  elderly  are 
the groups  most likely  to share  housing.  All this might  be  expected.  An 
important  new finding,  however,  is the time trend of  these  probabilities. 
Holding  all  other  factors constant,  the  risk of  institutionalization 
increased  substantially  between  1968 and  1984  while  the likelihood  of  being 
"taken  in" by  relatives  or  friends  markedly  decreased. 
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WEST GERMANY 1.  Introduction1 
The dissolution of  an  elderly  persons independent  household  ——  either 
to  live  in another household  or  to  becose  institutionalized ——  is an  in- 
cisive life—event  that has  many implications  for the well—being of  the 
elderly  person.  Most elderly hold moat or all of their wealth in housing.2 
In  most cases,  the dissolution  of an elderly persons independent  household 
implies the sale of the house and therefore a substantial  change in the 
elderly's  wealth  position.  In case of  institutionalization,  some of this 
wealth may be  used to pay for front—loaded  fees; in the case of  moving  to 
own children,  the wealth  may be transferred  to the next generation by 
transferring  headahip  of the family home. 
The choice of living arrangements  by the elderly  is also  an  important 
aspect  of  the economics of aging at large because of the side—effects in 
the  provision  of care and the physical  environment  that this choice in'— 
plies.  Sharing  accommodations, in  particular  with adult  children, will not 
only provide housing  for the elderly but also some degree  of medical  care 
and social support for the elderly.  If the elderly perceive  sharing accom- 
modations  as  an  inferior housing alternative  and remain  living independent- 
ly as long as their  physical and  economic  means  allow,  this social support 
and a larger amount of  medical care have  to  be  picked  up by society at 
large rather than the  family  or close  friends.  Moving to adult children  is 
also  an  important substitute for institutionalization.  As  the private  and 
social costs of institutionalization are  sky—rooketing,  the family may  have 
to  become  yet again resort for the elderly.  This  is not only  a guestion of 
distribution ——  whether the  family  or society  at large pays  an otherwise 
equal  bill.  One  may also  argue  that  independently living elderly  are  more isolated and incur higher costs  fur medical care and  social support,  e.g. 
because  of  the psychosomatic  effects of isolation or  due to a lower inter- 
est  in preventive  care by elderly living alone. 
Household  dissolution  decisious  also have imçortant consequences  for 
the intergenerational  distribution of  housing.  In particular  in times of 
tight housing market conditions  with very high housing  prices for newly 
developed units,  the elderly's  willingness  to move out of the family hcere 
is  an important parameter  in the supply of  more affordable  existing  homes. 
If elderly households  stay in their family  homes  well into their 80's, the 
next generation will have little chance to  move into the family homes  while 
their children (the third generation) are being raised and demand  for space 
is largest.  If houses  of younger  families  with  children  are relatively 
more spacious  than those of the elderly, the elderly may  become  perceived 
as being "overhoused"  with the notion of intergenerational  inequity. 
Household dissolution  may  change  the eligibility for certain govern—  - 
ment programs.3  Eligibility  and transfer level  for  the food stamp  and  the 
supplemental  social security program is determined by  the  income  of  the 
household,  not by  the  income  of the elderly.  Elderly who  received sup- 
plemental social security incc*se  may loose this income once  they move  to 
children with  own  anccme.  This  may  induce  elderly  to stay  living as an  in- 
dependent  household  longer  than  they sey want to  in  absence  of these trans- 
fer programs. 
Finally, Schwartz, Danziger  and Smolensky (1984)  point  out a perverse 
effect in  measured income  inequality:  if  the  proportion of independently 
living elderly increases,  then,  ceteris paribus,  income  inequality will 
rise because there axe  more small households with low income  than if they had lived  in a joint household with a combined larger  income.  The incclse 
distribution  effect  is perverse when  it  was  a slight  increase  in the elder- 
ly's income  that produced  the increased proportion of elderly  livir in- 
dependently.  Of course, the effect is purely statistical  and vanishes, 
when incase  inequality  is measured not on  the level  of  households,  but  on  a 
lower  level, e.g., on  the  level  of  feafly nuclei.4 
This  paper studies  the  demographic and economic determinants of  the 
elderly's  decision to slay  living independently  or to dissolve  the  indepen- 
dent household in order  to  choose some  kind of shared accommodations or  tic, 
move in an  institution  such  as  a nursing home  or  a home  for the  aged.  The 
main questions being asked  are: 
o  What  are typical sequences  of  living arrangements  in old age?  How 
often  do  elderly transit  between their home, their  children, and an 
institution? 
o  Which  events precipitate  changes in  living arrangements?  What  are 
typical living arrangement  sequences  after retirement, after death  of 
a  spouse,  after onset  of a disability,  and in the years preceding 
death? 
o  Are  there cohort or calendar—time effects  in the preferences  for 
certain living arrangements  that can be  distinguished  from pure  age 
effects?  Are  the elderly  becoming  more isolated in the  last years? 
o  How  many elderly remain  living independently  until  they die?  Who are 
the elderly living  independently?  Are they younger, are they 
wealthier,  are they isolated? o  Are economic  conditions  (income  housing prices)  important 
determinants  for the choice among living  independently,  sharing accom- 
modations,  and living in an institution?  Or is the decision  to give 
up  an independent  household simply determined  by age and health? 
The  paper  is  one of a  triad of  papers  on household  dissolution  and 
choice of living arrangements  of elderly Americans  in this volume.  tt 
poses some of the same  questions  (and arricas at  very  similar answers)  as 
the paper by  Ellwood  and  Kane, using  the same data but  a very different 
methodology.  The coincidence  of all major results yields  some confidence 
in the robustness  of  our results in spite of  many data problems.  Whereas 
this and Ellwood and Kane's paper concentrate on  the  demand  for dependent 
and independent  living arrangements,  the triad's third paper by  Kotlikoff 
and Morris  is more  interested in the  supply  side  and closes a  model  of 
living arrangement  choices by  providing  a structural model of dependent 
living arrangements. 
Economic  incentives  for household formation  and, by implication, 
household dissolution  have been extensively studied  for the general popula- 
tion in the seventies.  A  survey  of  this literature can  be  found in Borsch— 
Supan (1986).  With focus on the elderly,  this research  has been  picked  up 
recently  by two papers  that employ different  data sets in  order  to study 
determinants  of living arrangements  for the  aged.  Schwartz, Danziger  and 
Smolensky (1984)  employ the Retirement  History Survey  (miS)  to estimate a 
binary choice  model between living independently  end dependently -—  that 
is, in another household, most commonly  that of their  children.  In spite 
of the size of this data set,  their empirical results  were mixed,  and 
neither health nor income effects  could convincingly be  proven, mostly  due to their econometric  methodology and  the  poor  health  measures  available in 
the  ailS.  Boersch—Supan  (1988)  estimated a multinomial  logit model of 
living arrangements  on  data  from the  Annual  Housing  Survey  (Ails)  that 
distinguishes several dependent  living arrangements  rather than just one 
category.  Both papers share  two  important  shortcomings:  their data sets 
prohibited  an analysis  that takes institutionalization into account, and 
neither paper performed a  dynamic analysis.  Overcoming these two  short- 
comings is in the focus  of this paper. 
The  probability of institutionalization per se is  the  focus  of  many 
studies  that  arm  reviewed  by Oarber  and MaCurdy's  paper in this  volume.  In 
contrast to  these papers,  this paper concentrates on  permanent  in- 
stitutionalization  as  opposed to the more  frequent  short—term stays in 
nursing homes.  Garber  and MaCurdy's paper  provides some  link between short 
and  long—term  institutionalization hy mndogenizing duration of  stay. 
The  paper is organized as  follows.  As answers  to  the first three 
groups  of the  above  enumeration  of questions require  panel data,  and ans- 
wers  to all questions  demand  data with  a lot of detail about elderly  per- 
sons  and their  living arrangements, we will first describe  the data,  their 
novelty and problems, and present  the construction of  the essential vari- 
ables.  section 3  provides estimates  of transition probabilities for all 
elderly  in our sample.  Sections 4,  5,  and 6 are  then  devoted to three  sub— 
samples,  each  relating to a particular life—event.  We will first analyze 
transitions in response to the death of a  spouse,  investigate transitions 
after  the onset of a disability  in Section 5,  and will finally focus on  the 
last  five years  of  life of those elderly  who  decease  during the  sample 
period.  Sections  3  through 6  are organized as  variations  on  a theme and 
have  a  common  pattern.  First, we will categorize observed sequences  of —6— 
living arrangements  and describe  their frequencies.  Second, multinomsal 
logit  models are employed in order to estimate the weights of  potential 
causes  for these sequences  or choices  of  living arrangements.  The  final 
section susesarizes  the results and critically  discusses  the papers  assump- 
tions  and data  sources. 
2. Data and Variable Definitions 
An  empirical investigation  of living arrangement  transitions  faces 
many technical problems.  First,  the detection  of transitions  and an 
analysis  of living arrangement  sequences requires a longitudinal data  set 
that covers  a  long  time span.  There are just  very few long panels  in the 
United  States, the longest being the Panel Study  of Income Dynamics. 
Second, elderly  are particularly prnne  to become "non—responses'  in a sur- 
vey  for systematic reasons: although their geographic mobility is low  which 
alleviates the  problem of locating elderly respondents,  they may  become  in- 
stitutionalized or decease.  In  most surveys,  these persons are  then  lost 
in  the sample.  Third, a study  of  living arrangements  needs  information not 
only  about the  iimsediate  household,  but  also of the family of the elderly 
person who may provide alternative living arrangements.  Similarly,  for 
such a study one  needs to  know a costhination  of economic)  demographic,  and 
health variables that is unusual  for most general purpose surveys.  Final- 
ly, the very old may have difficulties  in answering  questions precisely, 
particularly about their health status, so that the interviewer  has  to 
phrase questions  more  carefully and double  check answers,  Currently,  there 
is no data set fulfilling  all these requirements  simultaneously. 
our  analysis  is based on the new complete  family—individual  based  file 
of the  Panel  Study of Income Dynamics  (PSID) 1968  to 1984.  This file in— cludes all persons who have ever been interviewed  as member of a PSID fasu— 
ly.  In contrast  to earlier P8W  releases,  it also includes  people who are 
classified  as non_respondents  in the last available  interview year (1984), 
e.g.,  persons, who have died in the course of the panel  study.  The data 
therefore provides a new opportunity  to look at the economic  and housing 
conditions  of the very old, particularly  those who  have  died, and the 
transitions preceding death. 
Main  advantage of the PSID  is its long time horizon of up to 17 years. 
This enables us  to create event histories  and  to detect  typical sequeoces 
of  living arrangemenis, and  to estimate transition probabilities that 
depend  on  age  as  well as  on  calendar time.  Another  important  advantage  of 
the  PSID  for the  study  of living arrangement  decisions  is the collection of 
at least some  data at the individual  level (rather than household  level) in 
the  so—called family—individual  file,  and  the careful recording of 
household  composition  as it relates  to  the head of household.  This  makes 
it possible  to detect elderly living as  subfaisilies  or as  "secondary in- 
dividuals"  in households  headed by  their  children or other persons. 
Finally, the  non—response file keeps  records for persons even  when  they 
become  institutionalized.  This  is in contrast to all major  cross—sectional 
data sources that comprise either the institutionalized or the  non— 
institutionalized population,  as  well as  in contrast to  most longitudinal 
data sources that have  only  one non—response  category  and  do  not dis- 
tinguish  between institutionalization,  death,  or  other  reasons for non— 
response. 
In  addition  to its extreme unwieldiness,6  the PSID has also several 
severe shortcomings  that limit  the kind of analysis  that would  be ap- 
propriate  for the study  of the elderly's  living arrangements.  Host  irs-. --B.- 
portantly,  the  P5Th  does  not contain a systematic record cf the  functional 
health  status  of the elderly.  We  will depend on  age and an indicator for 
disability status  as  variables  proxying health.  The  PSI!) does  not record 
structural housing  characteristics that could  allow for a precise  defini— 
tion of housing prices  corrected for guality differences.  Unit housing 
prices  must be assigned  from external sources  such as the American  Housing 
Survey.  Another problem are the many changes and  inconsistencies  in data 
collection  procedures and  variable  definitions  during  the 17 years  in which 
the PSI!) has been conducted.  Unfortunately,  this also includes  the clas- 
sification of  persons  as institutionalized  and  the procedures to  trace such 
persons.  The  creatiun  of  an  internally  consistent  file requires  a substan- 
tial amount  of  data processing, and it was  not always possible  to  create  an 
unambiguous and consistent  variable definition for all included  time 
periods.  Finally, though some  information  (e.g.,  age,  sex,  and  income)  is 
recorded  by  individual  household member,  other  information  about  in- 
dividuals  is either subsumed  in a household  total or available only  for 
head and  spouse. For example, race,  number of own children and siblings, 
and  retirement  date are recorded only for heads of  households  and their 
spouses.  Hence,  these variables can only  be assigned  to individual  sample 
members if they have been head or spouse at least once during  the sample 
period.  This  excludes  some  kinds of analyses and creates  a  selectivity 
bias  in other  analyses. 
As  a first step preceding the analysis,  the PSI!) family—individual 
file was therefore  converted into a rectangular  file of elderly  in- 
dividuals.7  Variable definitions  cossnon  for all waves  were employed, and 
time—invariant  data that were collected only for heads  and spouses were as- 
signed to  these individuals  in periods in  which  they were neither head nor 
spouse.  As  "elderly" were  defined individuals  who  were  aged  60 and  above in 1968.  This includes  1134 observations,  Of those, 956  are  in year 1968 
in the sample and represent  a  random  sample of the population  aged 60 and 
above.8  An additional  178 elderly  are picked up  after  1968,  typically, 
when they join a family  from the original  P510) sampling  frame.  This part 
of the sample  is non—random  as its inclusion in the sample depends on the 
choice of living arrangement  and will  only be employed  when conditioning on 
the origin of transition  removes  this choice bias. 
eased on  the household information collected in the  P503,  the  main 
dependent  variable  in  this study  ——  the type of  living arrangement 
——  can 
be  classified according to  four categories: 
— Independent  living  arrangements:  the  elderly's  household does not 
contain  any other  adult  person beside  the elderly individual  and his/her 
spouse, if  any (living arrangement  type 
— Shared living  arrangements:  the  elderly's household  contains  at 
least one  other adult person beside  the elderly individual  and his/her 
spouse.  Two  cases  can be  distinguished: 
— —  The  elderly  is head  of  household  or spouse of head  of household 
(living arrangement  type 2).  In this case, the relationship  between the 
elderly and all other  household members  is  well documented. 
— —  The elderly  is neither head of  household nor  spouse  of head  of 
household  (living arrangement  type 3).  In this case,  the relationship 
between  the elderly and the  other household  members cannot be unambiguously 
determined.  Most  importantly,  the  data  does  not provide a distinction 
between  an  elderly  person living in the household of her/his son—in—law and an  elderly  person living with  in the household  of an  unrelated person.10 
— Institutional  arrangements:  This category  includes  elderly 
who are  living on  a  permanent basis  in a  health—care  related  facility 
(living arrangement  type 4).  Examples  are  living in a home for the aged or 
in a nursing home but not temporary hospital  or  nursing home stays.11 
This categorization  deserves some comments.  First,  it would have been 
desirable  to distinguish  between adult children/elderly  parent—households 
and households  in which elderly share  accom!eodations with  other related or 
unrelated  persons.  This  is impossible because  of the  head—centered record- 
ing of family relationships.  Most but not all shared accosssodations 
represent  adult children/elderly  parent—households.  Based on  the national 
file of the  1983 nnual Mousing  Survey,  62.1 percent of all composite 
households including an elderly  person  were children/elderly  parent(s)— 
households (including in—laws), in 27.2 pnrcent of  these households  the 
elderly  person shared accommodations with  a rclated individual  other  than 
child (mostly siblings),  and in the remaining  10.7 percect at least one  un- 
related person  lived in the composite household  (excluding  in—laws).12 
second, it  would  have been desirable  to distinguish  between parents 
who live  together with  their adult children because the  children  have  not 
yet left the household (this is a clear possibility for the younger  aged 
who raised children late  in their lives) and parents  who have  been  "taken 
in" by their  children but are legal  owner of the  family  home  and  therefore 
head of household.  This is impossible in lack of a  complete life—history 
of all household  members.  On  the other hand, we  make  a point of dis— 
tinguishing  headship  from being a  secondary  individual in  a composite 
household. —11— 
Third,  the concentration on  permanent nursing  home stays  as  a  measure 
of  institutionalization does  not correspond  to  many published numbers that 
also  include temporary nursing home stays.  Most  nursing  home stays are 
quite brief  (e.g., for convalescence)  and  do not imply  that the household 
was dissolved  (e.g., by selling the house or moving  out of an apartment). 
These  temporary nursing home stays  are treated like hospital  stays and the 
person's living arrangement  is  the  living arrangement  before and presumably 
after  the  hospital stay.  It is  important  to  keep  this in mind when inter- 
preting  the relatively  small  percentages of institutionalized  persons  in 
this paper.13 
3.  A Markov  Model  of  Arrangient transitions 
We will first estimate transition probabilities for the entire random 
sample  of elderly  individuals.  In  addition  to establishing some  general 
tendencies,  these  transition probabilities will serve  as  a yardstick  when 
we  study transition probabilities in special  situations such  as  the years 
preceding death,  the years after  death of a spouse, or the years after 
onset of a disability. 
Table  1  provides a  survey  of  what happens in  the  sample:  it presents 
the frequencies of living arrangement  sequences  among  the 956 elderly whose 
life—history can  be traced from 1968 on.  602 of these elderly deceased 
during the sample  period, and 354 elderly survived until  1984.  The fre- 
quencies are reported  once for the entire  sample,  and once for the sub- 
sample of surviving elderly. —12— 
Please insert Table  1  about here 
The first result  is the stability  of living arrangements  in spite of 
the  long  sample period and the large proportion  of  elderly  who  die during 
this  time  span.  More  than two  thirds  of the elderly  in both  samples  do  not 
change  their  living arrangements  at all.  Most of the elderly  stay living 
independently through  the entire  sample period or until  their deaths.  14.4 
percent of all elderly shared at least once  a household  not being  head or 
spouse of  head1  and 3.1 percent have  been in an institution  at least  for 
one  entire year  during  the sample period.  Apart from  a  higher  proportion 
of multiple  changes, there  is astoundingly  little difference  between  the 
two subgroups  in the sample, the surviving elderly  and those  who  deceased 
before  1984. 
This large proportion  of stayers creates a problem in the specifica- 
tion of transition  probabilities.  First, with  only  relatively  few transi- 
tions,  the statistical base for the estimation  of  parametric  transition 
probabilities  is very small.  1  choose not  to  employ relatively sophisti- 
cated  hazard-models  based  on continuous  time since  they are more  likely  to 
generate imprecise  results than simple Markovian models.  The  paper by 
Ellwood and  Kane  included in this volume provides an analysis  of living ar— 
rangements  parallel to this one using the  same data but duration  models 
based on an exponential  hazard.  It is interesting  to note that all im— 
portant  qualitative  conclusions  from these  two papers  coincide  in spite of 
the  different  methodologies. 
Second, the  large proportion  of stayers suggests  that a  model of Table  NcIES  OF  LIVING ARRANGEMENT CE  68-1964  (absolute  and relative  frequencies) 
All 
Survjvin  Sequence Type  Elderlya  Elderly 
No  sasple 
(1)  Independent 
(2) With others, as head or spouse 
(3) With others,  as secondary  individual 
One  5Ple pd 
(I)  to (2) 
(1)  to (3) 
(I) to  (4) 
(2) to (1) 
(2)  to (3) 
(2) to (4) 
(3) to (2) 
(3) to (4) 
More than one  n  same 2d 
Between (1) and  (2) only  All others 




25  7.1 
140  14.6% 
16  4.5 
48  13.5% 
34  3.6  15  4.2  .4  0  .0 
6  .6  0  .0 
71  7.4  29  8.2 
2  .2  1  .3 
.5  0  .0  11  1.2  2  .6 
125  13.1%  67  18.9% 
9.9  60  16.9  30  3.1  7  2.0 
Total 
956  100.0%  354  100.0% 
Note:  a)  All  elderly aged 60  and  above  in 1968 
b)  Elderly aged 60 and above in 1968 who survived  at least  until  1984  Source: PSID,  1968_1984,  including non—respondents —  13— 
simple Markov  transitions will  not describe  the data well.  This  is  so  be- 
cause  even if one— period transitions  are estimated  correctly? a standard 
first—order  Markov  model will  predict  tcc many  transitions  within  two or 
more  periods.14  This effect may be  attributed  to either  unobserved  popula- 
tion heterogeneity  (certain  types of individuals  self—select  into certain 
categories  of living arrangements)  or  duration  dependence  (the likelihood 
of leaving a living arrangement  category  decreases with  the duration  in 
this category).  Because of  the few transitions observed  in Table  1, we 
will not be able  to statistically  distinguish  between  these  two possi- 
bilities.  As  was  mentioned  in the preceding section,  the data lacks some 
obviously  important information  (such as  detailed  health  status).  There- 
fore, the  heterogeneity  model  appears most  appropriate  in this situation. 
tIne solution  to the heterogeneity  problem  that is well—suited  for this 
application  is the so—called mover—stayer model developed by Goodman  (1961) 
and expOsed in Memiya  (1985) that accounts for population heterogeneity by 
dividing the  sample  in stayers  that never change  their living arrangement 
ad movers that  may  or  may not change their  living arrangement  in any given 
period.  Transition probabilities 9(t) from living arrangement  category I 
to j for a given individual,  unidentified  to  be  either a mover or a stayer, 
are then given by 
P. .(t)  = d.  S.  +  (1—S.)  M. .(t) 
13  1  2.  13 
where  Si denotes the proportion of stayers  in category i, 11(t)  the 
transition probability  of movers  from category i to j,  and d=l if i=j,  0 
otherwise.  We will  identify  stayers  as  those- elderly who  do  not change 
their  living arrangement  in the  17 years  between 1968 and 1984 or  between 
1968 and their  deaths.  Note  that unlike  in other  applications  of the —14— 
mover—stayer model  the  long tism horizon and the fact  that  death  excludes 
further changes provides for a reliable estimate of the stayer 
probabilities.15  We  then estimate  the  matrix  of mover  transition 
probabilities M..  by  the  sample frequenoies of  observed  transitions by 
movers,  the  maximum  likelihood  estimate.  Table  2 presents  the  transition 
probabilities  for movers  and  the resulting unconditional transition 
probabilities P..  according to the  mover—stayer heterogeneity assumption  in 
the  above equation: 
16 
Please insert Table  2 about here 
The unconditional transition probabilities  will serve as  baseline 
estimate  with  which  transition probabilities in special  situations will be 
compared.  Note that the  matrix  of two period transitions has  a larger 
diagonal than the  square  of the transition matrices17 —— it is this  feature 
of  the  mover—stayer model  that helps describing the stability of the  elder— 
ly's living arrangements. 
In order to  characterize  the stayer population,  Table I  reports  multi— 
nomial  logit estimates  that relate  the three stayer probabilities  S., 
1,..,3,  relative  to  the probability  of being a mover to  a set of 
demographic  and economic  variables.  There  are no elderly who stay in an 
institution  throughout  the entire  sample period  (S4O).  Two sets of 
estimations  are provided: one  for the entire sample, combining  stayers who 
died during the sample period  and stayers who survived at least until  1984: 
and one set of estimations  for  the surviving elderly only. Table 2:  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES 
(1)  Transition  Probabilities  for Movers, N. 
Type  of  living arrangement  at  origin: 
Type  of  living  arrangement 
at destination: 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (1) 
(1) Independent  .8987 
(2) With others,  as head/spouse 
.0913  .0032  .0069 
.1996 
(3)  With others, as secondary ind.iv. 
.0019  0066 
.0761 
(4) Institution 
.7970  .0558 
.0345  .0000  .1034  .8621 
(ii) Unconditional  Transition  Probabilities,  P. 
12 
Type  of  living arrangement 
Type  of  living arrangement 
at destination: 
at origin:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(1)  Independent 
(2) With others,  as head/spouse 
.0411  .0014  .0031 
.1850 
(3) With others, as  secondary  mdiv. 
.8071  .0018  .0061 
.0685 
(4) Institution 
.0640  .8172  .0503 
.0345  .0000  .1034  .8621 
Source: PSID,  1968—1984,  elderly aged 60 and mere  in 1968, including  non— 
respondents. —15— 
please insert Table  3 about here 
Most variables employed in Table 3  are  self—explanatory.  AGK68  is age 
in year 1968.  SINGLE  (MARRIED)  is a  dummy  variable  denoting that the 
elderly  wax single (married)  during  the entire  sample period.  SPERM is  the 
average  incoem  during the  sample period.  NONWHITE includes black, 
Hispanic, Asian, Pacific, and Native  American elderly.  KIDS  (5185)  denotes 
the  number of own  children  (siblings) if reported,  NOKIDS  (NOSIBS)  is  a 
dummy  variable  denoting that the elderly has  no  children  (siblings). 
Finally, the  dummy  variables MDKIDS  (MDSIBS) indicate missing data on  num- 
ber of children  (siblings).  The  variables  KIDS and  RIBS are only reported 
in years when the elderly person was head  of household  or spouse.18  Thus 
data on  own children and  siblings is unavailable whenever  an  elderly person 
was never head of household or spouse  during  the entire  sample period. 
This  lack  of precise data about potential family support in  this case  is  a 
major draw—back  of the  data.  The duimxy  variables  MDKIDS  and  MOSIBS  that 
indicate  these cases eliminate  any bias  in  the KIDS and  NOKIDS  variables 
(SIBS  and  NoBlES, resp.)  for those elderly  in which  this information  is 
available. 
The positive  coefficients of the SINGLE and  MARRIED variable  indicate 
that  the probability  of being  "mover" increases  by experiencing a marital 
status change which in almost all  cases represent death of  a  spouse.  This 
is of  course  not surprising, and we will analyze  the  living arrangement  ad- 
justments after  the death of  a  spouse  in the following section.  Male 
elderly  are much more  likely to  be  movers  than  female  elderly.  Note that 
this effect is measured  holding marital  status constant.  As  we will see, Table 3:  A LOGIT  MODEL  OF  STAYER PROBABILITIES 
(Paraseter estimates,  t—statistic.s in parentheses) 
Log  odds  of  staying in  . ... rather than changing 
(1)  )2)  (3) 
Independent  With Others,  With Others 
as  Head/spouse  as  secondary  mdiv. 
Sample  b  VARIABLE  Mean  Alla  Out-v.  All  Sot-v.  All  Surv. 
CONOT  1.0  —0.778  1  .386  —2.000  —16.687  —8.135  —81  .048 
(—0.8)  )  0.7)  (—1  .1)  )  0.0)  (—2.8)  (—0.1) 
AYE68  68.4  0.011  —0.020  —0.030  —0.002  —0.031  0.060 
0.8)  (—0.6)  (—1.3)  ) 0.0)  (—1.1)  1  0.6) 
KIDS  2.7  —0.012  0.111  0.054  0.088  0.097  0.096 
(—0.3)  11.7)  )  1.2)  11.2)  1  1.0)  10.8) 
NOKIDS  .18  0.585  0.840  —0.300  0.010  0.960  —10.450 
2.4)  )  2.1)  (—0  .6)  1  0.0)  ) 0.8)  1  0.0) 
WDICDS  .14  —0.448  0.020  —0.100  —12.024  5.149  3.764 
(—1.1)  1  0.0)  1—0.2)  1  0.0)  1  6.2)  1  2.1) 
0150  4.6  0.029  —0.045  0.067  0.009  0.612  9.380 
0.7)  (—0.8)  1  1.0)  1  0.1)  (  1.9)  ) 0.2) 
1100155  .04  —0.162  —0.011  —0.435  —13.255  —1.652  62.374 
(—0.4)  1  0.0)  (—0.4)  1 0.0)  1  0.0)  1  0.1) 
MDSIBS  .25  —0.510  0.036  —0.348  —12.018  6.600  75.719 
(—1.5)  1 0.1)  (—0.5)  1  0.0)  1  2.8)  1  0.2) 
NONWHITE  .16  —1.498  —2.380  0.735  1.520  —0.944  —1.220 
(—6.0)  (—4.8)  1  2.3)  1  2.8)  (—2.0)  (—1  .1) 
FNWALE  .54  0.349  0.467  0.512  12.773  0.353  0.012 
1.7)  1  1.3)  1 1.2)  1 0.0)  1  0.7)  )  0.0) 
YPERM  2.84  —0.026  0.008  —0.053  0.006  0.049  —0.131 
(—1  .5)  (  0.3)  (—1.1)  1  0.1)  1  0.6)  (—0.5) 
SINGLE  .30  0.378  —0.404  2.147  2.267  1.375.  0.410 
1.81  (—1.2)  1  3.8)  1  2.1)  )  2.4)  1  0.4) 
MARRIED  .43  1.617  0.057  2.928  14.692  0.579  —12.486 
7.3)  1 1.4)  (4.8)  (0.0)  1  1.1)  1  0.0) 
Liklihood 
at convergence 
Rho  = 1  — L(8)/L(0): 
(LIOn:  All:  —735.66  Out-v.:  —261.06 
0.444  0.468 
Percent correctly  predicted:  67.26  64.69 
Number of observations:  956  354 
Note:  a) All elderly aged 60 and  above 
b) Elderly aged 60 and above in 1968 who survived at least  until  1984 
Scurce: P010,  1968—1984, elderly  aged 60 and  nmre  in 1968 who never  changed 
their living arrangement,  including non—respondents. 
in 1969 —  16— 
this  effect will become  even  more  pronounced when  we  study the  cases in 
which a  spouse deceased.  Pace  has  a  very  strong isçact on  the stayer 
probabilities.  Being nonwhite  decreases  the  prohability  uf staying 
independent  or  as secondary  individual, but increases the probability  of 
heading a  composite  household.  There  are  no  measurable  income effects,  nor 
does the elderly's  age  in year 1968 affect  the scver—stayer  proba- 
bilities.19 
Although  the measurement  of the "supply—side"  variables  for shared 
living arrangements 
——  the number  of  own  children  and siblings 
——  is marred 
by  the above—mentioned  incomplete  information on  these  two variables, we 
can ascertain that the probability  of being a stayer  in the category "In- 
dependent  Living Arrangements"  increases with being childless, just as  the 
presence of children  and siblings increases  the  probability to  be  stayer in 
the  two  shared accosssodation  categories.  These  latter two  effects are 
however very  small.  We  conclude  that most shared living arrangements  are 
of a transitory nature.  The probability  of  staying as secondary  individual 
is most strongly affected by  the MDKIDS  and MDSIBS  indicator variables. 
This  is not surprising  because by  construction  these variables work  essen- 
tially as  choice-specific  constants  for the choire of living arrangement 
type  3. 
There  is little  significant  difference  between the two  subgroups  in 
our sample.  Due to the smaller  sample size,  the results  for the surviving 
elderly are  less precise.  This is particularly  true for the third column 
(staying with  others  as secondary  individual). 
We will now turn to the transition  probabilities  of those elderly who 
changed their  living arrangement  at least once  during the  sample period. —1  7— 
As  is obvious from Table  2, sons of these transition  probabilities  are very 
low, and  it is therefore  impossible  to separately  relate all  16 transition 
probabilities  in a meaningful  way  to  the  above set  of relevant  demographic 
and  economic variables.  Table  4 provides  some  results  for the transitions 
between living arrangement  types 1  and 2,  and,  most interestingly for our 
topic household  dissolution, the  transitions into type  3  (living with 
others  as  secondary  individual, in most oases  being  "taken  in"  by  adult 
children)  and  type  4  (institutionalization).  The upper  panel  describes  the 
binary  choice  between  staying in either a  type  1  or  type  2  living arrange- 
ment and a transition  to type 2 or 1,  respectively, conditional on  having 
been  identified  as mover  at least at sorts point  in time,  not necessarily 
this time.  Possible  transitions  to the other  two  categories  3 and  4 are 
being ignored,  making  usage  of  the  logit functional  form and the in- 
dependence  of irrelevant alternatives.  The lower panel pools  all origins 
in order to gain degrees of  freedom in estimating  the transition 
probabili  ties into the latter  two  living  arrangement  types. 
Most of the variables have  already been  introduced in Table  2.  In  ad- 
dition, we now measure  some demographic and economic changea  that occurred 
concurrently with  the transition.  DINCOME denotes the  magnitude of a real 
income change,  DMARN  denotes a  change in  marital  status  )1='becoming 
married,  O=no change, —1=loss of  a  spouse, divorce,  or separation),  and 
DLIM  indicates  a  change  in limitation  status  (1=health status worse  than 
previous year,  O=no change,  —1=health status better  than previous  year). 
Please insert Table  4  about here Table 4:  LOGIT  MODELS OF  MOVER  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES 
(Parameter  estimates,  t—statistics  in parentheses) 
Log  odds  of  noving  . ...  rather than staying: 
from (1)  independent  from (2)  Shared  as  head 
to  (2) Shared as head  to (1)  independent 
Log  odds of sowing  to .. rather  than  staying or sowing elsewhere 
Variable  mdiv. 
to (4) 
Institutionalized 
CONST  15.324  (  4.6)  —17.501  (—3.3) 
KIDS  0.167  )  3.1)  —0.245  (—1.3) 
NOKIDS  1.943  C  3.8)  —0.875  (—0.9) 
MOKIDS  3.444  (  4.9)  —1.542  (—1.2) 
SIBS  0.057  (  0.6)  —0.131  (—0.8) 
NOSISS  2.232  )  2.8)  0.017  C  0.0) 
MOSIBS  1.610  C  2.3)  3.750  C  3.2) 
NONWHITE  0.824  (  2.3)  —0.223  (—0.3) 
AO8  0.045  C  1.7)  0.17S  C 3.7) 
F1ALE  —0.931  (—2.5)  —2.225  (—3.1) 
INCOME  —0.030  (—0.4)  —1.595  (—4.2) 
DINCOME  0.022  C  0.3)  —1.688  (—4.5) 
MARS  —2.033  (—5.1)  —2.324  (—3.0) 
DMARR  —1.606  (—2.6)  —5.800  (—5.6) 
DLIM  0.103  C  0.2)  —0.103  (—0.1) 
ORIOIN1  —3.430  (—6.3)  —1.691  (—2.7) 
YEAR  —0.265  (—5.2)  0.072  C  1.5) 





% correot  89.38  96.20 
ROSS  480  368 
Source: P510,  1968—1984, elderly  aged 60 and sore in 1968 who at least  once 
changed their  living arrangement,  including  non—respondents. 
Variable 
CONST  —2.614  (—1.67)  0.889  (0.58) 
KIDS  0.061  C  1.70)  0.005  C  0.16) 
SISS  0.030  C  0.96)  —0.041  (—1.45) 
NONWHITE  0.348  C  1.63)  0.348  C  1.79) 
A0E68  0.015  C  0.96)  —0.006  (—0.39) 
FNWALE  —0.354  (—1.83)  —0.165  (—0.90) 
INCOME  —0.021  (—0.65)  0.011  C  0.43) 
DINCOME  —0.001  (—5.83)  0.045  C  1.16) 
MARS  —0.739  (—3.50)  0.295  C  1.52) 
DMASR  —1.529  (—4.34)  1.319  C  3.23) 
OLIM  0.280  C  1.62)  —0.249  (—1.35) 







%  correct  90.92  79.71 
ROSS  1862  1030 
—— 
to (3) 
Sharing  as  secondary —18— 
We  will  first comment on  the left part of the upper panel  in Table  4 
that  reflects  the choice between  a  transition  from living indepeodently  to 
sharing  a household  as head or spouse of head,  and staying independent. 
The loss of a spouse  (DMARR),2° change in the severity of a  disability 
(DuN),  and  a loss in income  (DINCONE) are the most important  determinants 
that precipitate  this transition.  All other  things equal, elderly women 
tend to stay independently  whereas elderly  men rather  tend to share accom- 
modations.  These  results correspond  to the same effects in  the  stayer 
population.  Not being married in the first place strongly  increases  the 
likelihood  of a transition,  as does  the presence of  children,  of siblings 
(though statistically not significant)  ,  and being nonwhite.  Neither age 
nor  calendar  time significantly alters the transition  probabilities  between 
living arrangement  types 1  and 2,  nor  does  the level  of income. 
Not surprisingly, the reverse transition ——  breaking up a composite 
household  to  become  independent, right part of upper  panel in Table  4  -—  is 
essentially  characterized  by the opposite mechanisms.  Some of these 
transitions appear to be statistical artifacts, iuch  as  the  marriage  with a 
person who  was already living in the household as  an unrelated secondary 
individual.  This  may  be indicated by the strong coefficient of DMARR. 
Note that nonwhite  as  well as  male  elderly  are more likely to ohange living 
arrangements, as was  the case in  the  reverse  transition. 
The lower  panel  indicates the probabilities of being taken in by 
others  and beooming institutionalized.  As  is evident,  both  probabilities 
increase with age, in particular the risk of institutionalization.  Being 
or becoming single and being  male also increases  these  probabilities.  The 
presence of children or siblings decreases the risk of institutionaliza- 
tion, and increases  the likelihood of being taken  in, as is expected. —19— 
Again,  the measurement of this "fasily support-supply effect"  suffers  from 
the  large number of observations  for which a  precise number  of ohildren  or 
siblings  cannot be ascertained  (as indicated  by the variables MDKIDS  and 
MDSIBS).  Most  transitions  into institutionalization  or subfamily status 
are from living arrangement  types 2  through 4,  as  indicated  by  the  strong 
negative coefficient on  the variable  ORIGIN1 that denotes transitions from 
living independently, once  again reflecting the stability  particularly of 
the  independent  living arrangement  category.  Finally,  and this is worth 
emphasizing,  we  observe a strong negative  income effect on the likelihood 
of entering  an  institution.  Institutions are clearly viewed as inferior 
living arrangements. 
As  opposed  to the probabilities in the  upper panel,  the transition 
probabilities into institutions  and being  taken in are  non—stationary. 
This is indicated by the effect on the variable YEAR which measures 
calendar  time.  The  probability  of  institutionalization,  controlling  for 
all other factors included in the lower panel, exhibits an  increasing 
trend,  although measured imprecisely.  The  likelihood  of being taken  in, 
however,  decreases between 1968 and  1984, with a large  and statistically 
highly  significant  coefficient.  This result has  a  strong  and isportant im- 
plication:  there appears to  be  a decreasing inclination of the family or 
friends  to take  care  of "their" elderly, and an  increasing reliance on in- 
stitutions  such as nursing homes with  their  related private  and social 
costs.  The parameter  estimate of the risk  of institutionalization  is not 
measured  statistically  precisely because it  is based  on  relatively  few 
transitions.  If one anyway takes  this estimate  as best available  guess, 
then it translates  to a  yearly  increase of  about 7  percent,  that is, a dou- 
bling  of the risk of institutionalization  within  10 years.21 It.  !4fln  Arrangent  Chaeg after Death of a 
The  analysis  in the preceding section suggested  that death of  a spouse 
is the cost important life—event  precipitating  a  change  in living arrange- 
ments.  The logit  regressions  in Table 4 related living  arrangement  adjust- 
ments  to a concurrent  change  in marital status.  This section  will take a 
closer  look at the  dynamics of what  happens after  the  death  of  a  spouse  by 
studying not only  changes  in the  concurrent  year but also  in consecutive 
years. 
In  our  sample, 317  elderly  experienced  the death of their spouses  and 
survived at least one further year.  Table  5 presents  the frequencies with 
which living arrangement  transitions occur  in the year of the spouses 
death  and  in the following years. 
Clearly,  the transition probabilities in the year of the spouse's 
death (panel B)  are  quite different from what they are  in the general 
population (panel  A,  from Table  2).  mtarting from living independently, 
the transition probability  of joining another household  as  heed  of  house- 
hold becomes  twice  as  large.  The transition probabilities to subfamily 
status and  into an  institution  increase even more than tenfold  (first row 
in  panel  B).  If the elderly couple headed a composite household,  the death 
of the spouse also  resulted  in  a much elevated likelihood  that this common 
household  is broken up, either  leaving the surviving  spouse alone in the 
family home or as a new independent  household (second row in panel B). 
Note that the probability  of  becoming institutionalized  is very  high in the 
year in  which the  spouse  deceases.  In a formal test, the equality  of 
panels A  and  B  is strongly rejected.22 —21-. 
Please insert  Table 5  about here 
A  comparison  of  the panels in Table  S  clearly shows  that  most living 
arrangement  adjustment  in  response  to  death of a  spouse  have  taken  place 
already in  the  concurrent year.  Though  panels C  through  E  are still 
statistically different from panel A,  the size  of the  chi—squared  test 
statistic is much lower as  compared to  the test  between panels  A  and  B. 
One  year after the  spouses death,  the  probabilities  of  a  transition  between 
shared  and independeot  living are still elevated,  but this  is reversed in 
the  second year. 
Table 6  presents some  logit estimation  results for the  first year 
transitions.  They confins  the  general  tendencies  detected in Table 4  for 
all movers also  for this special  case  of  transitions zest  likely pre- 
cipitated by the  death of  a spouse.  Unfortunately,  the  small sample  size 
prevents  a more detailed analysis,  for instance,  a  stratification by living 
arrangement  prior to  death of spouse. 
Please  insert Table 6 about here 
The  presence  of children  or siblings increases  the  probability of 
being  taken in after  the spouse's death.  Old age, low  income to begin 
with,  or an income loss increase  the likelihood of  a transition  into an in- 
stitution.  Female  elderly are more likely to stay living in the  family 
home than widowers.  If a health limitation develops  concurrently with  the Table  5:  TRANSITION  peOBASILITIES  AFTER DEATH  OF  A  SPOUSE 
Type of living arrangement 
at origin: 
Type  of  living arrangement 
at destination: 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(1) Independent 
(2) with  others, as head/spouse 
(3) with others, as seoondary  mdiv. 
(4)  Institution 
Oil—squared  statistic  (B—A): 1005.60 
(C)  One Year Later  (301  observations): 
(1)  Independent 
(2) with others, as head/spouse 
(3) with others, as secondary  mdiv. 
(4)  Institution 
Chi—squared statistic  (C—A)  :  47.77 
.8565  .0826  .0217  .0390 
.3556  .6600  .0000  .0444 
.0244  .1220  .8049  .0488 
.0000  .0000  .0000  1.000 
.9362  .0638  .0000  .0000 
.2041  .7959  .0000  .0000 
.0000  .0000  .9670  .0330 
.0000  .0000  .3333  .6667 
(D) Two  Years Later  (267  observations): 
(1) Independent 
(2) with others, as head/spouse 
(3) with others, as secondary  mdiv. 
(4)  Institution 
chi—squared statistic (D—A)  :  57.05 
.9656  .0287  .0000  .0057 
.1429  .5771  .0000  .0000 
.0000  .0000  1.000  .0000 
.0000  .0000  .0000  1.000 
(E( Three  Years Later  (239 observations): 
(1) Independent  .9542  .0458  .0000  .0000 
(2) with others, as head/spouse  .1860  .8140  .0000  .0000 
(3) with others, as secondary  mdiv.  .0000  .0000  1.000  .0000 
(4) Institution  .0000  .0000  .0000  1.000 
Chi—squared  sta  tistic  (E—A)  :  40.63 
Source: P510,  1968—1984, 317  elderly aged 60 and isire in 1968 who lost 
their  spouse, including  non—respondents. 
(A)  lnoonditional Transition  Probabilities (from Table  2): 
(1) Independent 
(2) with  others,  as head/spouse 
(3)  with others,  as secondary  mdiv. 
(4) Institution 
.9544  .0411 
.1850  .8071 
.0685  .0640 
.0345  .0000 
.0014  .0031 
.0018  .0061 
.8172  .0503 
.1034  .8621 
(B) Year concurrent with  Death  of Spouse  (317  observations): Table  6: LOGIT  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES:  AFTER DEATH OF SPOUSE 
(Parameter  estimates.  t—statistics in  parentheses) 
Log odds of transition to  . ... rather  than  to  (U)  Independent 
(2) with Others,  (3) with Others,  (4)  In- 
variable  as Head/Spouse  as Secondary  mdiv.  stitution 
CONST  14.555  —3.676  —23.051 
3.1)  (  —0.4)  )  —2.2) 
AOE68  —0.022  0.029  0.123 
—0.7)  (  0.6)  )  2.4) 
KIDS  0.065  0.246  0.121 
1.1)  (  1.5)  )  0.7) 
NOKIDS  —0.369  1.307  0.630 
—0.5)  C  1.0)  )  0.6) 
MOKIDS  0.653  5.650  —0.466 
0.5)  (  3.1)  ) —0.3) 
SIRS  —0.079  0.191  —0.130 
—0.8)  C  0.8)  C  —0.5) 
NOSIS5  —0.165  —5.485  1.643 
—0.2)  C  —0.1)  C  0.9) 
MDSIBS  —0.951  3.374  4.670 
—0.8)  C  1.7)  C  2.8) 
NONWHITE  1.283  0.510  1.620 
2.7)  C  0.6)  )  1  .8) 
FEMALE  —0.560  —2.533  —2.344 
—1.2)  C  —2.7)  C  —2.3) 
INCOME  —0.156  —0.748  —0.641 
—1.1)  C  —1.5)  C  —2.1) 
OINCOME  0.016  0.343  —0.935 
0.1)  )  1.1)  C  —2.2) 
OLIM  0.630  2.333  —0.585 
1.1)  (  2.4)  C  —0.6) 
ORIOIN1  —2.856  —2.237  —0.581 
—6.3)  )  —2.0)  C  —0.6) 
YEAR  —0.165  —0.021  0.171 
—3.1)  (  —0.2)  (  1.6) 
Liklihood at convergence  (L(6fl:  —140.0808 
——  — 
Rho  =  1  — L(6)/L(0):  0.6812 
Percent correctly predicted:  85.80 
Number  of  observations:  317 
Source:  P510,  1968—1984,  317 elderly  aged 60 and core in 1968 who lost 
their  spouse, including non—respondents. —  IL— 
death of  a  spouse,  the  surviving  elderly is most likely  taken in  by the 
family or  by  friends  rather  than being institutionalized.  Nonwhite  elderly 
are less likely to stay independently  than white  elderly. 
Living arrangement  prior  to the spouse's death  is accounted  for by the 
variable oRIGINi  (if independent)  and,  though indirectly,  by the missing 
data indicators.  Note that because 1101(109 and MONIES  essentially  serve as 
indicator variables  for categories  2 and 3, introduction of variables such 
as ORIGIN2 and  0510153 would  result  in almost perfect  collinearity with 
MOXIDS and  MOSIBS.  The  negative  sign of  01(10151  (the reference  case) and 
the positive signs  of the statistically  significant missing data variables 
indicate the smaller likelihood  of a  change as  compared to staying in 
living arrangements  1  ,  2 and  3. 
Stationaric  of these  transition probabilities is clearly rejected: 
the results confirm  the existence and the direction of the  time  trends al- 
ready discovered in Table 4,  All other determinants equal,  institution- 
alization is becoming more  likely,  and being taken in  by  family or friends 
is becoming  less  likely  as  tire proceeds  fran  1968  to  1984. 
5.  Living Arrangenent  Changes after Onset of a Disability 
The  logit estimates  for all elderly  movers  in  Table  4  did also  confirm 
the common sense notion that disability status is an  important factor 
determining  an elderly's  living arrangement.  This  section  makes  an  attempt 
to identify  oases in which  a disability occurs  suddenly  in order to in- 
vestigate  the  time  pattern  of living arrangement  adjustments precipitated 
by this  event. —23— 
In  fact, changes in disability  status are quite  hard to  measure,  in 
general  and particularly in  the  PSID.  The question  in the  survey  ("Are you 
limited  by  a  health condition?") provides for  four  answers  ("A lot", "Some- 
what",  "A  little", and No  (  that  depend  on  the  subjective  self—rating of 
the  elderly person.  Prior to  1976, only  two  categories were  provided 
("Yes"  and  No(.1l  Not  too surprisingly, limitation histories are  charac- 
terized by a lot of ups and downs  that may partty reflect actual subjective 
feelings, and  partly arbitrariness in the choice of  categories.  In addi- 
tion, many  elderly experience a  gradual decline  in health status with no 
clear  onset of a  disability  that could be  classified  as "one event." 
We define the onset of a disability  quite  conservatively  as a 
permanent  change in  disability  status: in order  to qualify,  disability 
status must he  "No" for at least 5 years,  then "Yes",  "Somewhat",  or "A 
lot" for at least  another 5 years.  With this definition, we  count  237 
elderly-in our  sarrqise who  esperience a well defined and sudden change  in 
health  status.  Table  7 presents  the actual  number of  transitions  that  cc— 
cur  in the year of  the health change and in the  three years thereafter. 
Elderly persons who  are  in  a  nursing home are excluded in this  sample be- 
cause their  limitation status  is not  recorded. 
Please insert Table  7  about here  - 
Unfortunately,  main conclusion from these transitions is  that  the  nor— 
bers of actual  changes  are  too small to  draw reliable conclusions.  A 
formal  test of whether  the  corresponding  conditional  transition probabili- 
ties are  equal  to those predicted in the  lower panel of Table  2,  is signi— Table  7.  TRANSITIONS  AFTER  ONSET  OF  A  DISASILITY 
rype  of  living arrangement 
at destination: 
Type of  living arrangement  at origin  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Ci) Year concurrent with  Onset of Disability: 
(1) Independent  147  9  3 
(2) with others, as head/spouse  3  41  2 
(3) with others, as secondary  mdiv.  0  0  31 
(ii) One Year Later: 
(1) Independent  135  4  0 
(2) with others, as head/spouse  5  41  1 
(3) with others, as secondary  mdiv.  I  0  22 
(iii) Two Years Later: 
(1) Independent  109  5  0 
(2) with others, as head/spouse  5  37  0 
(3) with  others, as secondary  mdiv.  o  0  19 
(iv) Three  Years Later: 
(1) Independent  84  6  0 
(2) with others, as head/spouse  4  28  0 
(3) with others, as secondary  mdiv.  0  0  17 
Source: 9510,  1968—1984,  237 elderly  aged 60 and  sore in 1966 who experienced 
a well—defined onset of a disanility,  including non—respondents. —24— 
ficant  in the period concurrent  with  the  disability  change,  barely sig- 
nificant one year later, and insignificant  two and three years  later.  24  If 
a  reliable result  can be estracted from Table  7, then it is a  larger 
probability  to stay in living arrangements  type 2 and 3  (i.e., living 
together with  children, other  relatives,  or unrelated  persons(  in response 
to a sudden health change  to  the worse.  Unfortunately,  the lack of dis- 
ability data  for institutionalized  persons made it inpcssible  to deiect 
transitions  into nursing homes  after the death  of a spouse. 
It should be noted  that these weak results are only apparently  in con- 
trast to  the strong  eignificance of  the variable  DLIM  (change in the 
severity  of  limitation  relative  to the previous  period( in the previous 
logit  analyses.  This section limits itself  to the obviously  rare cases of 
sudden well—defined  unidirectional  health changes,  whereas  the variable 
DLIN picks  up many small changes.  In fact,  the idea of a sudden onset of a 
disability rather than  a gradual change  that  eventually  islioates  living 
arrangement  adjustments  may be inappropriate,  or, if such a thing as a  sud- 
den onset  exists,  the measurement of it by a subjective  self—rating rather 
than a functional  index  of ability may be misleading.  Some e'.idenoe  for 
the latter  explanation  can be found in Boersoh—Supan,  Icotlikoff,  and  Morris 
(1988(.  They  show that among the health  variables  available in their data 
set functional  ability is the one that best explains  living arrangement 
ohanges, rather than subjeotiva health indexes or indicators of  actual 
medical  conditions. 
6.  Living  Arrangement Changes in  the  Years  Preceding  Death 
This last section  investigates  where  the  elderly spend  the last five 
years  of  their  lives.  We will count time  backwards  (measuring  something like  negative age) and construct a  panel  that  starts with the year of 
each  elderlys death  for  those 602  elderly  for whom  date  of  death is ob- 
served.  of  those, 448 elderly have at least five years  of  complete  data. 
Table  8 presents  the  cross—sectional  distribution of living arrangement 
types by year before death, and Table  9 displays  the  frequency  of all 
living arrangement  sequenoea  observed  in this sample. 
Please insert Tables  8 and  9 about here 
The  main message from these  two  tablea  is, once  again,  the stability 
of  living arrangements  ——  even  in the years  immediately  preceding  death. 
Almost four out of five elderly  (79.7 percent)  do not change  their living 
arrangements  during  this  time.  Note that this  fraction is even larger than 
in the Alderly population as  a whole.  Though  one might expect a decreasing 
mobility  with very old age in  general,25  there is  also an increase  in the 
necessity  to adjust living  arrangements in this segment  of life,  for in- 
stance induced by an increasing  frailty in the years  preceding death.  ob- 
viously,  at least in this PSID sample, the first  mechanism  is stronger  than 
the second. 
Mere than half (55.4 percent)  of the elderly  have been living indepen- 
dently until  their deaths.  Every  fifth of all elderly  (20.1 percent) has 
been taken  in by her/his children,  relatives, or friends  at least  once 
through  the  last five years before death,  moat of them  (15.2 percent)  at 
least for  these five years.  Finally, about six percent of the  elderly 
became  institutionalized during  this tine period, almost all  of whom stay 
so until  their deaths. Table  8:  LIVING  ARRANGEMENTS  BY YEAR BEFORE DEATH 
(csrcen  rages) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Independent  With Others,  With Others,  Institu— 
Year  as  head/spouse  as secondary i.  tionalized 
5  64.1%  16,7%  16.5%  .07% 
4  64.7  15.6  18.3  1.1 
3  65.2  15.8  17.6  1.3 
2  64.7  15.8  17.6  1.8 
62.5  16.1  16.3  5.1 
Note:  Year  1  represents year of  death. 
Table  9:  LIVING  ARRANGEMENT  SEQUENCES;  LAST  FIVE  YEARS  BEFORE DEATH 
(absolute  frequencies) 
Sequence  Frequency  Sequence  Frequency 
11111  248  22111  6 
11112  11  22114  2 
11113  1  22211  4 
11114  5  22214  1 
11121  1  22221  7 
11122  5  22222  39 
11144  2  22224  3 
11211  2  24333 
-  1 
-11221  1  24444  1 
11222  3  32222  2 
12111  1  33211  1 
12122  2  33222  1 
12211  1  33331  1 
12221  1  33332  2 
12222  2  33333  68 
14111  1  33334  4 
21111  5  33344  1 
21112  1  33433  1 
21122  1  33444  2 
21222  3  43333  1 
Rote:  Sequence 11112  denotes the thoioe  of living 
arrangement  type 2 in the  year of death, and  of 
type  1  in the preceding  four years.  The four 
living  arrangement  types are denoted  by: 
1 =  Independent 
2  = With others, as head/spouse 
3  = With others, as secondary  individual 
4 = Institutionalized 
Source: 9510,  1968—1984, elderly aged 60 and nnre  in 1968 
who died before  1984. —26— 
The  few  changes  observed  ifl  the  sample  would put any dynamic analysis 
on very  weak  feet.,  Hence, we will recur to cross—sectional analysis  in 
this section.  Table  10  provides  a cross—sectional  analysis  of where  the 
elderly  choose  to live  within their last five years  of  life.  The sasple 
consists of  all observations with  cosplete data.26 
Please insert Table  10 about  here 
The analysis  in Table  10 confirms what we have  learned so far and 
shows that sose  of these effects  are particularly pronounced  for the  very 
old and rest vulnerable elderly.  Female elderly are  more  likely to live 
independently than male elderly.  Black or Hispanic  elderly  have  a higher 
likelihood  of living in  shared  accommodations, as do  elderly  with  many 
children.  Being married has  the  expected  strong positive effect  on  living 
independently.  Finally,  the variable YEAR  that indicates  calendar—time 
(not tire before death)  once again  displays  the trend  towards institutiona- 
lization  and away from composite  households.  Note  that in this  sample of 
the very  old  the magnitude of this trend is particularly  pronounced.  This 
is a  disturbing  finding as it appears to indicate a trend  towards  isolation 
of those who are particularly vulnerable. 
A  new variable  included  is denoted  by AGEKID  and measures  the  age of 
the oldest child.  The strong negative coefficient of this  variable  in the 
leftmost column that  characterizes  composite  households  headed by  the 
elderly  person appears to indicate  the presenca  of adult  children  who have 
never  left home.  As was mentioned already in Section  2, it would have  been Table  10:  C8OSS-SECTIONAL  CHOICE  PRORARILITIES: FIVF.  lEANS  6EN&RE SEAT))  — 
(Looit Paraaeter  estimates, t—statistics in parentheses) 
Log odds  of  living in  . ... rather than in  (1) Independent 
(2)  with Others,  (3) with  Others,  (4)  In- 
Variable  as Head/Spouse  as Secondary  mdiv.  stitution 
CONST  6.640  12.038  —26.603 
4.0)  (  2.4)  (  —4.1) 
A0E68  —O018  —0.043  0.030 
—1.5)  (  —1.2)  )  0.7) 
KIOS  0.139  0.211  —0.076 
5.5)  )  4.3)  1  —0.5) 
NOKIOS  —2.447  —1.777  —2.305 
—6.7)  (  —1.4)  )  —1.7) 
AOEKIO  —0.047  —0.042  —0.029 
—4.2)  1  —1.6)  1  —1.)) 
0203  —0.085  —0.134  —0.543 
—2.5)  )  —1.3)  (  —2.7) 
NOSI8S  0.298  1.468  1.641 
1.1)  )  2.0)  1  2.0) 
NONWHITE  1.359  1.832  0.358 
7.0)  (  4.4)  (  0.5) 
FEMALE  —0.471  —1.676  —1 .873 
—2.5)  )  —3.7)  )  —3.3) 
INCOME  —0.018  —0.024  —0.757 
—1.2)  )  —0.5)  )  —4.1) 
MARRIEO  —1.029  —4.493  —3.523 
—5.8)  )  -6.6)  1  —6.0) 
LIMITEO  —0.014  —0.497  —0.704 
—0.2)  1  —2.3)  )  —2.3) 
H0ORDEN  0.012  —0.061  0.023 
2.5)  )  —0.9)  )  1.7) 
YEAR  —0.057  —0.120  0.352 
—2.4)  )  —1.7)  )  4.0) 
Lik1ihcod  at convergence  (L)3)):  —911.1028 
Rho  =  1  —  L(0)/L)0):  0.6326 
Percent  correctly predicted:  oo.oo 
Number of observaticns:  1789 
Scurce: 8510,  1968—1984, elderly  aged 60 and nnre in 1960 who  died  before 
1984. — 27— 
desirable  to separate  these cases  from other shared  living arrangements. 
However,  the  lack of complete life—histories  of all  household  mesthers  makes 
this  impossible. 
Two economio variables  are included.  The elderly  person 
• s  income  has 
a measurable  effect only on the probability  to become institutionalized, 
the negative  sign shows  the inferiority  of this alternative  —— a  familiar 
result by now.  The newly  introduced variable  HBURDEN is the proportion of 
income which  the household  cost spend on housing;  actual  gross  housing 
costs  (either rent or user costs  of homeownership  plus utilities)  are 
divided by  household  income.  For institutionalized persons, it measures 
the last housing burden before institutionalization.  For  elderly  heads,  a 
large burden  is a small but  significant incentive  to share housing.  A 
large housing burden appears also to be a factor that increases  the 
likelihood  of  entering  an  institution. 
7.  Suary and Conclusions 
We  employed the  newly—available non—response file of the Panel Study 
of Income  Dynamics to study the  living arrangements  of elderly Americans. 
In spits of  being a  general purpose study  that contains  all some 1100 
elderly aged 60 and above, this file is  on first  sight particularly  suited 
to study  the elderly's  living arrangements  since  it includes  long histories 
of living arrangements  and their  demographic  and economic determinants  and 
since it  keeps  the elderly in the sample when they  decease during  the 
sample period  or, most importantly, become  institutionalized.  No other 
representative  data set combines euth a  long  time horizon  as the P510 with 
a complete  recording of  non—responses  due to death  or institutionalization. 
Co the other  hand, problesm with  the data —  being  only partly  individual— —28— 
oriented with  an  incosplete  recording of  family relationshipat  onro 
secondary  individuals are living in a composite  household  mount  ttenr.tes 
in the treatment of  institutionalization  and a  sample  size  ton  small  for 
the  few  observed  transitions ——  substantially inhibited the possihte  kinds 
of longitudinal  analyses.  A longitudinal  study specifically for  the elder- 
ly  is  still highly desirable  for dynamic  analyses of the elderly's  living 
arrangement  transitions. 
Main result of the paper  is the stability of living arrangements. 
Even after incisive  life—events  such as death  of a spouse or  onset  ot a 
disability,  and  even within  the last five years before death  often  as- 
sociated with  a guick deterioration  of health, only very few elderly  adjust 
their  living arrangement, say, in order  to move into the household  of their 
children  or to live in an institution. 
This stability,  however, puts the analyst  in  an  awkward  position as 
the resulting small  absolute  number  of  changers  in the PSID  creates  a 
problem  for the  dynastic analysis.  It is cur opinion that there are just 
ton few people to support a rich dynamic analysis.  A gobe  example  for thi 
point is  the analysis  in  the  preceding chapter.  A  well—suited  statiatio.ol 
model would have  been a fixed  effects  nodel that  accounts  for time- 
invariant but  unobserved  differences  ("heterogeneity")  among the elderly, 
such  as frailty.27  However,  the conditioning  on fised effects necessary 
for consistent  parameter  estimation  also removes all other  time—invariant 
determinants  because  these are collinear with  the fised  effects.  To put it 
simply, only time  variation  identifies  the  dynamics of a  dynamic model. 
Little time  variation in the remaining  variables and  few  transitions ob- 
served in the  sample render the resulting fixed effects model completely 
unsatisfactory.28 S'Je  therefore  employed very  simple  models,  hoping  that simplicity  will 
ansure  robustness.  daselne transition probabilities were estimated using 
a  mover—stayer  model that accounts  in the most simple way for unobserved 
hetercgeneitv  and the transition probabilities  in  the three  special cases 
investigated were parametrized  mm  parsimoniously  as  possible.  S4a  think 
this  strategy is more  appropriate  than  employing continuous—time hazard 
models.  (Is  one hand, the  data appears to  be  too weak  to allow for proper 
identification of heterogeneity  and state dependence  that could provide the 
rich dynamics hazard  models mre able to generatc.  Ignoring  state 
dependence  and unobserved  hatarogeneity, however,  say render  hazard models 
inappropriate  when  important  variables such as health are  unobserved. 
In  spite of all these problems,  we  arrived  at quite a  few results  that 
appear to be  robust and are  important  for the  assessment  of where  the 
elderly chome  to  live  and what implications  this  choice  has  for  the elder- 
ly's  well—being.  These  results are  robust  am  they can  be  drawn not only 
from  the different models  in this paper  but also from Ellwood  and Kane's 
(1989) analysis  based on  a simple exponential hazard  model.  They are  im- 
portant as they indicate where, if at  all, public  policy could  improve  the 
well—being  of the elderly:  there appear to be  only a f  me intervention 
points  ——  most importantly death of a  spouse ——  when  active decisions  about 
living arrangements are being made. —30— 
o  Loss  of a spouse  is  the  most important event  that  precipitates living 
arrangement  transitions.  Almost all of these  transitions  take place 
in the same year  as the spouse's  death. 
o  Living in  an institution is clearly  an inferior  living arrangement  In 
terms  nf income, even in the years  immediately  preceding  death when 
medical  attention is most valued. 
o Male  elderly  are rore likely to live  with  others or to  become  in- 
stitutionalized  than  female  elderly  who  most  likely stay  living in- 
dependently until  their deaths.  This  is holding all other 
determinants, particularly marital  status,  constant. 
o There  is a  pronounced difference  in  the  choice  of  living arrangements 
between white and nonwhite elderly.  Nonwhite elderly  are  much  more 
likely to live with others  in  a  composite  household. 
o  In  spite  0±  the  perceived inferiority of institutions,  the risk of in- 
stitutionalization has  substantially risen  fran 1968 to 1984, while 
the likelihood  of being  "taken in"  by  relatives  or  friends  has fallen 
dramatically. 
This disturbing  tendency  towards isolation of  the elderly —  particularly 
pronounced  ameng  the very old  who are also  the most  vulnerable  —— is  the 
most important message of this paper.  As pointed  out n  the introduction, 
this  growing isolation of  the  elderly has  downstream consequences  in  terms 
of medical expenses  and social support that are rather costly for  society 
at large  and that have  to  be  borne  by a decreasing proportion of younger —31— 
people  ——  not  mentionirs  the psychological  and physical  problems  for the 
elderly themselves  caused by growing isolation. 
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2. Merrill  (1984). 
3. Schwartz, Danziger  and Smolensky  (1984). 
4. Soermch—Supan  (1988 ). 
5.  Such as the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey  (LRHS),  the Survey  of 
Incone  and Program Participation (SIPP) or the American Housing Survey 
(ASS)  for the non—institutionalized population, and  the National Nursing 
Home  Survey  (HNHS) and the Survey of Institutionalized Persons  (SIP)  for 
the institutionalized population.  Gne exception is  the longitudinal 
study by the  Hewrew Rehabiltation Center  for the Aged,  cf.  Soersch- 
Supan,  Itotlikoff,  and  Morris  (1988) fnr  an analysis. 
6. The complete  family—individual  file has almost 600  Megabytes.  To  make 
matters worse  and  due to  moving  in  and out,  panel members  sharing the 
same  household  are scattered throughout  the file. 
7. The data processing programs  are available  at reguest  for a fee covering 
duplication  and handling charges. 
8. Excluded  Is a  small  percentage of  elderly  individuals whose  living ar- 
rangement  history  could  not been  ascertained  because  of  interview 
refusal or failure to locate  them. 
9. There are a few  cases where  an  elderly  household  had children  under  18. 
These are included in  this  category. 
10. With the  exception  of  years  1982—84. 
11.  We  perceive entering  an  institution  an  an active  choice  that possibly 
depends on  demographic and  economic  characteristics an  well an  health. 
This  does  not necessarily  imply,  however,  that  the elderly  person  has  to 
make  the  choice  by  her— or  hiraelf. 
12.  Ssersch—Supan  (1980). 
13.  See Garber  and  MaCurdy  (1980) for an analysis  of lengths of nursing 
homa  stays. 
14. Cf. Amemiya  (1985). 
15. E.g., McCall  (1971). —32— 
16.  Unconditional in the  sense  that  they  describe  the transition  proba- 
bility of an  individual unidentified  to  be  either a  mover  or  a stayer. 
17.  For a proof,  of.  A,semiya  (1985), page 419. 
18.  In addition, KIDS is not reported at all in 1968. 
19. From  a retrospective  point of view  when  date of  death  on known,  remain- 
ing  years to  death  ("negative age") maybe a  more interesting variable 
than  ACE6B.  If this were so, there should be a significant  difference 
between  the coeffioients  in the ta subgroups  which  is  not  the  case. 
20.  This is looeely spoken.  Almost  all oases  of DMARR=—1  are deaths of 
spouses but  there are  also a few divoroes in old age. 
21. The parameter estimate  of  the  risk of being  taken  in implies a  yearly 
decrease of over  26 percent at sample average.  This  percentage change 
——  this is a relative  change,  not a change  in absolute percentage points 
——  is too  large to be  moaningfully  extrapolated  for  1 0  years because  in 
the highly nonlinear  logit model the  effect of a  change depends  on  the 
magnitudes  of  the  choice  probabilities. 
22.  The  fast is  constructed as  a joint test  of  the  16  conditional  transi- 
tion probabilities.  Because only  the  rows,  not  the  columns  in  each 
table are  adding  up,  the  thi—squared statistics have  12  degrees of 
freedom.  At  99 percent confidence, the critical value  is 26.22. 
23.  To make matters-worse, in some years, limitation  status  was asked :-rv 
for head and spouse, resulting in missing data  for those elderly who 
changed disability  status while not being head  or spouse  of  househcJ- 
24. At 99 percent  confidence. 
25. The results in Tables 3  and 4  neither  prove  nor reject  this hypothesis,  Feinstein  and  McFadden  (1988) report increasing  mobility  rates for 
elderly  aged 75 and  above  based on  BOlD data, but do not investigate  the 
very old.  Venti and  Wise (1988) cannot  find systematic  age differences 
in the narrow  age distribution of the Retirement  History Survey. 
26. There are  two  econometric  problems with these estimates:  selectivity 
bias and panel  bias.  Both appear  innocent  in  this  case.  The  way  in 
which data  on  children and siblings  is imputed  implies that elderly who  live as  secondary  individuals  in a composite  household  and in- 
stitutionalized  elderly  have  a larger than proportional  share  of  missing  data.  However,  the resulting  sample selectivity  is innocent due  to in- 
clusion of constants  and the logit functional  form (McFadden 1978).  The 
pooling  of cross—sections  in this nonlinear model  may result  also in 
biased  coefficients.  The  bias appears to be of no quantitative  im- 
portance in this  case as  coefficients estimated  from single cross— 
- 
sections  are of similar magnitudes  and agual  signs. 
27. Cf. Chamberlain  (1980)  for the  development of this model  and Bdersch— 
Sopan (1987) for some applications. 
28. See  also  the difficulties  experienced  by Schwartz, Danziger  and 
Smolensky (1984), and  the  large standard errors in Ellwood  and  Kane 
(1989). REFERENCES 
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